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11 Introduction
Since the 1990s, more and more companies have engaged in Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR), internalizing externalities and voluntarily overcomply-
ing with laws and regulations on environmental and social issues. This behav-
ior seems to conﬂict with the deﬁnition of corporate governance as “the ways
in which the suppliers of ﬁnance to corporations assure themselves of getting
a return on their investment” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997, p. 737). Why
do these shareholders take into account the interests of other, non-investing
stakeholders? We answer this question by modelling CSR in a corporate gov-
ernance framework. We show how CSR may aﬀect the agency relationship
between shareholder and manager, and how the shareholder may use it to
his own beneﬁt.
Embedding the interests of non-investing stakeholders in corporate gover-
nance is challenging. The main diﬃculty lies in the fact that there seems
to be an incompatibility between CSR and the legal notion of managers’
ﬁduciary duties. The latter clearly stipulate that managers must serve the
interests of the corporation and its shareholders. This view is perhaps best
illustrated by the opinion of Friedman (1970) who argues that “the social
responsibility of business is to increase proﬁts.” Tirole (2001) discusses the
feasibility of the concept of a ‘stakeholder society’ — which explicitly and
exogenously internalizes externalities — to replace the traditional corporate
governance framework and concludes that so far its proponents have not been
able to successfully come up with a set of governance mechanisms that can
foster this concept.
In this paper, we model CSR in a traditional corporate governance frame-
work, showing that we do not need the stakeholder society concept to explain
why CSR arises. We consider a principal-agent relationship where share-
holder and manager have conﬂicting interests (based on Burkart et al., 1998;
2and Aghion and Tirole, 1997) and add negative externalities of production
imposed on non-investing stakeholders. Also, we introduce an environmen-
tal or social activist who represents the stakeholders and may exert pressure
on the ﬁrm, hurting its reputation and thereby proﬁts. For example, the
activist may bring about an adverse (political) climate via a media cam-
paign, a consumer boycott, or a strike. In this model stronger monitoring
by the shareholder increase the probability of the manager’s decision to be
overruled and thus weaken the manager’s incentives to exert eﬀort. Thus,
the shareholder may be better oﬀ if he can commit to less monitoring. We
show that both CSR and the threat of pressure by the activist may allow
the shareholder to do so. In particular, the shareholder can use CSR as a
strategic device to induce the manager to increase eﬀort.
We distinguish various interpretations and forms of CSR. First, CSR may
concern altruistic behavior of a socially responsible or ‘socially minded’ share-
holder. More important, we show how CSR may arise endogenously for
agency reasons, arguing that a socially indiﬀerent (i.e. purely proﬁt-motivated)
shareholder may ﬁnd it optimal to commit to behave as a socially responsible
one. We somewhat cynically term this behavior ‘corporate hypocrisy.’ Here,
the shareholder chooses the objective function which guides his monitoring
behavior, via the extent to which he pretends to care about externalities.
By doing so, he commits to reduce his monitoring eﬀort, which increases
proﬁts. Next, we argue that since the shareholder may actually beneﬁt from
an activist’s threat of pressure he may ﬁnd it optimal to engage in a ‘bear
hug’ and sponsor an activist to give it the means to exert pressure. Finally,
we consider corporate control and contend that when socially responsible
and indiﬀerent shareholders coexist the socially responsible type may end up
owning the ﬁrm.
In the literature, no clear consensus has been established regarding the pre-
cise role of CSR. In order to assess this role one ﬁrst needs to analyze the
3underlying circumstances that trigger corporations to engage in CSR. Baron
(1995) characterizes CSR activities into two categories: (i) CSR used to re-
spond to pressure groups, avoiding a threat, and (ii) CSR in the absence
of pressure groups. In a later article Baron (2001) provides a further clas-
siﬁcation suggesting that CSR in the latter category is motivated either by
altruistic arguments or by proﬁt maximization. Note that actions to avoid
a threat usually are proﬁt-maximizing strategies as well. Thus, unless CSR
is purely based on altruism, shareholders must beneﬁt ﬁnancially. The ques-
tion then is: how do shareholders beneﬁt from CSR? Heal (2005) explains
CSR from economic fundamentals and interprets it as having an important
resource-allocation role. This refers to either alignment of private and social
costs of a ﬁrm’s activities or the reduction of distributional conﬂicts. By
reducing conﬂicts with their stakeholders or activists CSR may help com-
panies build trust or reputation, which boosts stakeholders’ conﬁdence in
dealing with them. This may raise the demand faced by the ﬁrm1; increase
the ﬁrm’s bargaining power (e.g., in wage negotiations or negotiations with
suppliers); raise the quality of the pool of available employees, suppliers, or
customers; decrease the cost of capital2; etcetera. Heal’s (2005) explanation
of shareholders’ beneﬁts from CSR focuses mainly on the eﬀects on the ﬁrm’s
reputation with stakeholders. In this paper, we add to this by modeling CSR
in a corporate governance framework and relating it to the agency problem
between shareholder and manager.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only a few articles presenting an ex-
plicit formalization of the link between corporate governance and stakehold-
ers’ interests. Pagano and Volpin (2005) analyze the relationship between
managers, shareholders, and workers. Their focus is on how long-term con-
tracts and high wages, which beneﬁt employees (stakeholders), can protect
1See Bagnoli and Watts (2003).
2See Heinkel et al. (2001).
4managers against hostile takeovers. Cespa and Cestone (2007) investigate
the conﬂicts of interest that might arise between managers, shareholders,
and other stakeholders in the case where managers — rather than ﬁrms —
can commit to CSR, and stakeholders other than shareholders can inﬂuence
the manager’s replacement. Here, we do not analyze the manager’s contract
or replacement. Instead, we focus directly on the principal-agent problem
between the manager and the shareholder.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present
our model of corporate governance in the presence of an activist. Section
3 solves the model. In Section 4 we examine alternative interpretations of
CSR in the context of our modeling framework and show how CSR may arise
endogenously for agency reasons. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
This section lays out our theoretical framework. We consider a ﬁrm owned
by a large (block of) shareholder(s) S and managed by a manager M. There
is also an activist A who represents a (group of) stakeholder(s). Each player
is risk neutral and maximizes his expected payoﬀ or utility. There are N +1
projects, denoted by i = 0,1,...,N, with N ≥ 5. Four of these projects are
special, including i = 0, and will be discussed below. We use a subscript j ∈
{M,S,A} to indicate a payoﬀ to player j, and a superscript k ∈ {M,S,A}
to indicate the payoﬀ to a player j if k’s preferred project (to be explained
below) is implemented.
Implementing a randomly selected project i ∈ {1,...,N} yields a negative
expected payoﬀ to each player, for example because one project gives each
of them a payoﬀ of −∞. Project i = 0 gives a payoﬀ of 0 to both M, S,
and A, and can be interpreted as the ‘status quo’ project. The other three
5special projects are the ones which yield the highest payoﬀ to M,S, and A,
respectively. We denote by ij the preferred project of player j. We assume
that there is a conﬂict of interest between the three players in the sense that
they all prefer diﬀerent projects.
The manager M receives private beneﬁts which take on their highest value
BM > 0 for project iM and value Bj, 0 < Bj < BM, for project ij, j = S,A.3
The shareholder S receives proﬁts4,5 which take on their highest value ΠS > 0
for project iS and value 0 < Πj < ΠS for project ij, j = M,A. Projects
iM and iS impose negative externalities on stakeholders. Since the activist
represents these stakeholders, we interpret the negative externalities as the
‘payoﬀ’ for the activist A. The negative externalities take on their highest
(i.e. the least negative) value −ΩA for project iA and value −Ωj < −ΩA for
project ij, j = M,S. For simplicity we assume that ΩA = 0. Thus, the
activist is indiﬀerent between the status quo and project iA, and therefore
will not exert pressure against the status quo. However, the manager and
the shareholder are not indiﬀerent between the two projects. As will become
clear below, the activist never ﬁnds it optimal to induce the shareholder to
change to the status quo project if either iM or iS was implemented initially;
however, he may be willing and able to induce the shareholder to change to
project iA. We will refer to this project as the preferred project of the activist
(in the situation where the status quo was not implemented initially).
We take into account that the shareholder may be altruistic or socially re-
3Note that in this setup the manager does not receive a share of the proﬁts (from
ownership or proﬁt-related wages), but private beneﬁts (and perhaps a ﬁxed wage) only.
4Formally, whenever S holds only a fraction of the shares of the ﬁrm, this fraction
should show up here. We ignore this here for simplicity, and interpret Π as proﬁts that
accrue to S.
5In the CSR literature, when analyzing the eﬀects of CSR on performance a distinction
is made between proﬁt and value (see e.g. Orlitzky et al., 2003). The latter may also take
into account a higher willingness to pay of ‘green’ investors for the shares of ﬁrms who
engage in CSR. We ignore this eﬀect and focus on proﬁts only.
6Payoﬀs of project
0 iM iS iA
Payoﬀs to
M 0 BM BS BA
S 0 ΠM − γSΩM ΠS − γSΩS ΠA
A 0 −ΩM −ΩS 0
Table 1: Payoﬀs of the preferred projects of the three players.
sponsible, that is, he may to a certain degree inherently care about the ac-
tivist’s payoﬀ. To model this we incorporate the negative externalities of the
projects in the expression for the payoﬀ or utility of the shareholder. Thus,
the shareholder’s payoﬀ from project ij, j = M,S, is expressed as Πj −γSΩj,
where γS ≥ 0 indicate the extent to which S cares about A’s payoﬀ, i.e.
his social responsibility.6 For now, we will assume that γS is an exogenous
parameter. We also assume that Πj − γSΩj > 0, j = M,S. The payoﬀs of
the relevant projects are summarized in Table 1.
The timing of the model is as follows. At t = 1 players M and S simulta-
neously exert eﬀort ej ∈ [0,1] at cost e2
j/2 in order to collect information.
With probability eM player M then obtains all information (i.e., payoﬀs to
all players from all projects). If M obtains the information, then with prob-
ability eS player S obtains the information as well. So, if M is not informed
then neither is S.7 At t = 2 player M announces the project he wants to
implement. At t = 3 player S may overrule M’s decision and announce a
diﬀerent project to be implemented instead. Overruling by S is assumed
to be costless. At t = 4 the selected project is implemented. At t = 5 an
activist may exert pressure on the ﬁrm, and at t = 6 the shareholder may
6Of course, we could also introduce a parameter γM describing the extent to which M
is socially responsible.
7This particular structure follows that in Burkart et al. (1998). It signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes
the calculations without changing the qualitative results of the model. It also stresses the
role of the manager in the model.
7decide to concede to this pressure. The latter two stages are now discussed
in more detail.
At t = 5 we assume that with probability p, 0 < p < 1, there is an activist A.
Alternatively, one could think of an activist who is always present, but who
is preoccupied with other issues with some probability 1−p, in which case he
has no time or funds available to pressurize the ﬁrm. Thus, we assume that
the negative externalities are imposed with probability one but the activist
is present (may exert pressure) only with probability p. After observing
which project is implemented A may exert pressure on the ﬁrm, e.g. by
damaging the ﬁrm’s reputation or inducing a boycott or strike which reduces
the (future) proﬁtability of the project, promising to restore the reputation
if and only if S suspends the project and changes course to implement A’s
preferred project. More precisely, suppose that at t = 4, project i ￿= iA was
implemented. We assume that A can exert pressure on the ﬁrm, discounting
the shareholder’s proﬁts by a fraction 1 − λ, 0 < λ ≤ 1, at a cost cA (λ),
where cA (0) = 0 and c￿
A > 0. We assume that if S was uninformed, A can
reveal the information. Note that the value of λ can be interpreted as the
extent of the pressure.8
Next, at t = 6, S may concede to A’s pressure and instruct M to suspend the
initially implemented project (at t = 4) and implement A’s preferred project
instead. This comes with a cost Cj ≥ 0 to j = M,S. We assume that
this cost is independent of which project was implemented originally, and we
assume that CS < ΠA for reasons that will become clear below. Finally, at
t = 7 payoﬀs obtain. The timing is summarized in Figure 1.
In order to be able to focus on the three most preferred projects ij, j ∈
{M,S,A}, we impose the following assumption, letting −Ω−A denote the
8Note that this structure of the model corresponds to the interpretation of CSR as a
hygiene factor: a ﬁrm is punished if CSR is at a low level, rather than rewarded if CSR is
at a high level.
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     -  t=1:  M and S exert effort ej and may obtain information 
 
     -  t=2:  M announces project 
 
     -  t=3:  S may overrule and announce different project 
 
     -  t=4:  selected project is implemented 
 
     -  t=5:  A may exert pressure 
 
     -  t=6:  S may concede to A’s pressure and announce a different project 
 
     -  t=7:  selected project is implemented and payoffs obtain 
Figure 1: The timing of the model.
payoﬀ to A from any project i = 1,...,N other than project iA.
Assumption 1 We assume that max
￿
−Ω−A￿
+ cA(1) ≤ 0.
This condition states that the highest possible payoﬀ to A, which he receives
from project iA (or i = 0), is at least cA(1) more than the payoﬀ he receives
from his second-best project. The term cA (1) reﬂects the highest possible
cost of pressure, which obtains for λ = 1. The assumption implies that no
matter which project i was implemented at t = 3, if A wants to exert pressure
and convince S to implement a diﬀerent project, it will be project iA.
We also impose the following assumptions on the expected payoﬀs to M and
S from their preferred projects.
Assumption 2 We assume that:
(i) the expected payoﬀ to M accrued from project iM when taking into





exceeds the expected payoﬀ to M accrued from any project i ￿= iM;
(ii) the expected payoﬀ to S accrued from project iS when taking into ac-








exceeds the expected payoﬀ to S accrued from any project i ￿= iS.
We will explain the role of Assumption 2 in the next section.
Finally, we make an assumption on the initial wealth of A. We will relax this
assumption in Section 4.4.
Assumption 3 The activist A has suﬃcient initial wealth to be able to exert
pressure in the equilibrium of our model.9
3 Solution of the model
We use backward induction to solve the model. At t = 6, if the activist has
exerted pressure, the shareholder must decide whether or not to concede.
The shareholder will concede to the pressure if and only if the payoﬀ of
conceding and incurring the associated cost exceeds the payoﬀ of adhering
to the implemented project j despite the pressure.10 Formally, this can be
stated as follows.
Condition 1 The shareholder concedes to the activist’s pressure against project




≥ (1 − λ)(Πj − γSΩj), or equivalently













9Together with the probability p that the activist is present, this is equivalent to as-
suming that the activist is present always but has suﬃcient wealth only with probability
p.
10For expositional convenience we assume that whenever S is indiﬀerent, he concedes.
10Note that since λ ∈ (0,1], this condition requires ΠA − CS > 0 and Πj −
γSΩj > 0. We assume that the shareholder’s cost of conceding, CS, is below
ΠA, to avoid the case where the shareholder never concedes. Also, we assume
that the shareholder’s payoﬀ from his most preferred project is suﬃciently
big even after we take into account the social responsibility eﬀect. In this
way, the shareholder may still ﬁnd it attractive, under some circumstances,
to pursue his most preferred project.
At t = 5, the activist (if present) will want to exert pressure λ on the ﬁrm
if and only if the payoﬀ of project iA net of the costs of exerting successful
pressure exceeds the payoﬀ of the implemented project ij. Formally, this can
be stated as follows.
Condition 2 Under Condition 1, the activist will exert pressure against










Note that this condition can never hold true for j = 0 since Ω0 = 0 and
c
−1
A (0) = 0, so the activist will not protest against the status quo. Obviously,
the activist will only exert pressure if it can indeed induce the shareholder to
concede. Using backward induction, this implies that A’s preferred project
iA will be implemented at t = 6 if and only if Conditions 1 and 2 are both





Lemma 3 The optimal pressure exerted by the activist is λ
j∗ = a
j




/(Πj − γSΩj) ∈ (0,1].
Proof. The lemma immediately follows using c￿
A (λ) > 0.
At t = 3 the shareholder has to decide whether or not to overrule the man-
ager’s decision. Note that in general, for some values of the parameters
11it could be optimal for S to implement a project diﬀerent from iS when
he is informed. For example, if S knows that A will successfully exert











. However, to make our
analysis more interesting — as well as tractable — we focus on less extreme
cases in which each player j continues to have an incentive to implement the
project ij, but the threat of pressure by the activist does aﬀect the eﬀort
levels of the manager and the shareholder (as will be shown below). This is
the reason why we imposed Assumption 2 above.
Recall that the shareholder may only be informed if the manager is informed,
and note that M will select iM whenever he is informed and i = 0 if he is
not (see below). If the shareholder is not informed, the best he can do is
to approve the project selected by the manager — either project i = 0 or
project iM. The latter project yields a strictly positive expected payoﬀ to
the shareholder, whereas the status quo yields a payoﬀ of 0, and any other
project implemented at random yields a negative expected payoﬀ. If the
shareholder is informed, it is optimal for him to overrule and implement
project iS. The payoﬀs to the shareholder will be discussed in more detail
below.
At t = 2 the manager has to announce a project. If the manager is not
informed, the best he can do is to announce the status quo. If the manager
is informed, given Assumption 2, he will ﬁnd it optimal to implement project
iM. The expected payoﬀ depends on the probability with which he gets
overruled by the shareholder, and on the probability with which the activist
may exert pressure and succeed in getting his preferred project implemented.
These payoﬀs will be discussed in more detail below.
At t = 1 both the manager and the shareholder have to decide on their eﬀort
levels. In order derive the optimal eﬀort levels (and the expected payoﬀs),
12we distinguish four scenarios that may prevail, according to whether or not
in equilibrium projects iM and iS, if implemented, will be replaced by iA if
the activist is present. For each scenario we focus on interior solutions for
expositional convenience, ignoring corner solutions, and we derive expressions
for the equilibrium eﬀort levels.11 The four scenarios are:
• Scenario I: Both projects iM and iS are replaced;
• Scenario II: Only project iM is replaced;
• Scenario III: Only project iS is replaced;
• Scenario IV : No pressure by the activist.
We discuss here only the derivation of the optimal eﬀort levels for Scenario
I. For the other three scenarios the analysis is similar; see Appendix A. Note
that Scenario IV is equivalent to the case where there is no activist at all,
i.e. p = 0.




1 for j = M,S. Then, if the
activist is present and either project iM or project iS was implemented at
t = 4, in equilibrium the activist will exert pressure. The shareholder S will
concede, so that in the end project iA will be implemented. In equilibrium,
the level of pressure exerted is λ
Ij∗ = a
j





where we use the superscript I to denote Scenario I. The expected pay-





, and the expected payoﬀ to the shareholder is (1 − p)(Πj − γSΩj)+
11It should be noted that if parameters are such that the expressions for eﬀort derived






, for j = M,S. Using this information, we can write the man-























































The above expected payoﬀs are constructed in the following way. With prob-
ability eMeS, the manager and the shareholder are both informed, and the
shareholder will overrule the manager’s project choice and ask the manager to
implement iS. With probability eM (1 − eS), only the manager is informed,
and thus it is optimal for the shareholder to let the manager implement iM.
Finally, with probability (1 − eM)(1 − eS), the manager and the shareholder
are both uninformed, and the status quo will be implemented yielding 0 to
both of them.
At t = 1, the manager and the shareholder simultaneously maximize their
expected payoﬀ with respect to their respective eﬀort levels, i.e. eM and eS.
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144 Corporate Social Responsibility
In this section we consider several interpretations and forms of CSR and
show how CSR may arise in the corporate governance framework developed
above. Our interpretation of CSR is a broad one. It may refer to very
‘explicit’ socially responsible behavior, such as the actual implementation
of the activist’s preferred project — either from the beginning to avoid any
threat, or at a later stage in response to activist’s pressure. Alternatively, it
can be more implicit, for example if altruism induces a socially responsible
shareholder to exert less eﬀort and thereby reduces the expected negative
externalities of the project to be implemented. We consider diﬀerent forms
of CSR, including altruism of socially responsible shareholders; ‘corporate
hypocrisy’ where socially indiﬀerent shareholders who do not inherently care
about negative externalities behave as if they do; and a ‘bear hug’ where so-
cially indiﬀerent shareholders explicitly sponsor the activist. We also discuss
how CSR may arise by way of transfer of corporate control.
4.1 Implementing the activist’s preferred project
The most straightforward interpretation of CSR is the actual implementation
of the activist’s preferred project iA by the shareholder. Note that if Assump-
tion 2 were violated, it could be optimal for the manager or the shareholder
to implement project iA from the beginning (i.e. at t = 2 or t = 3, respec-
tively). Although this could indeed occur in reality, it is not very appealing
from a modeling perspective, and therefore we ignore this possibility in our
analysis. However, we do allow for the possibility that the shareholder con-
cedes to the activist’s pressure at t = 6 and implements project iA thereafter.
Thus, using this interpretation, the above analysis indicates that for some
parameter values it may be optimal for the ﬁrm to engage in CSR.
154.2 Socially responsible shareholder
We can also think of CSR as some kind of action or eﬀort that increases
the probability with which a project with weaker negative externalities will
be implemented. This includes the case where the shareholder himself feels
socially responsible, in the sense that he also suﬀers some disutility from the
negative externalities imposed on the activist. In our model this is interpreted
as the shareholder having γS > 0.
In this subsection we therefore discuss and compare our results for two cases:
ﬁrst, the case of a socially responsible shareholder with γS > 0, and second,
the case of a socially indiﬀerent shareholder, who does not care at all about
the negative externalities, i.e. γS = 0. It is quite cumbersome to derive
complete comparative statics results of the optimal eﬀort levels in all of
the scenarios or to compare eﬀort levels across scenarios. The signs are
often ambiguous. Instead, we believe that it is more fruitful to study the
manager’s and the shareholder’s eﬀort levels and their interactions for the
two cases γS > 0 versus γS = 0. Doing so will allow us to evaluate the
possible impact of shareholder social responsibility on the agency problem,
i.e. on the interaction between the shareholder and the manager.
In Scenario I, the best response functions of the manager and the shareholder
































By deﬁnition BS < BM, hence it is obvious that eM decreases with eS.
This is the adverse eﬀect of shareholder monitoring on managerial eﬀort.
However, the impact of an increase in eM on eS is ambiguous. It depends
on the sign and size of γS
￿
ΩS − ΩM￿
. When the shareholder is socially
indiﬀerent (γS = 0), its impact is unambiguously positive. This is because
16the shareholder can only be informed if the manager is informed. If the
manager increases his eﬀort, his chance of being informed will increase, and
this will beneﬁt the shareholder and induce him to exert higher eﬀort. An
increase in the probability of the activist’s pressure, p, will not only inﬂuence
eM (or eS) directly, but also indirectly through a change in eS (or eM).
Therefore, the impact of a change in p on eM and eS is ambiguous. Similar
arguments apply to Scenarios II-IV .
Note that when γS increases we may move from one scenario to another.







/(Πj − γSΩj) > a
j
2, for j = M,S. Suppose that we
are initially in Scenario IV in which both projects are not replaced by the
activist’s project. When the shareholder becomes more socially responsible
(γS increases), the left-hand side (LHS) of the expression increases. For





2, and thus only the manager’s preferred project will be replaced.
We may also end up in Scenario I or III.
When we compare eﬀort levels for both cases within a given scenario, it can
easily be veriﬁed that having a socially responsible shareholder may either
increase or decrease the manager’s eﬀort level. This depends on the relative
magnitude of the externalities imposed on the activist or stakeholder by the
shareholder’s preferred project and the manager’s preferred project, ΩS and
ΩM. Note that the shareholder’s own eﬀort level diﬀers among the two cases
as well. We have the following result:
Result 1 In our model, comparing a socially responsible shareholder to a
socially indiﬀerent shareholder, we ﬁnd that (i) the eﬀort level of a socially
responsible shareholder is lower than that of a socially indiﬀerent shareholder
and (ii) the eﬀort level of the manager is higher in the presence of a socially





ΩS > (1 − p)ΩM
(1 − p)ΩS > ΩM
in Scenarios I and IV ,
in Scenario II,
in Scenario III;
we ﬁnd the opposite result otherwise.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition behind this result is the following. When the condition stated
in the result is satisﬁed, project iS is relatively less attractive as compared to
project iM to a socially responsible shareholder than it is to a socially indiﬀer-
ent shareholder. Thus, in this situation the socially responsible shareholder
has weaker incentives to monitor and overrule the manager, which gives the
manager stronger incentives to exert eﬀort. If the condition is not satisﬁed,
project iS is relatively more attractive to the socially responsible shareholder,
which increases his incentives to monitor and thereby lowers the eﬀort of the
manager.
Summarizing, a socially responsible shareholder will adjust his eﬀort level in
favor of a project with weaker externalities, thereby making it more likely
that this project is implemented. Note that this result is also valid in the
absence of an activist, where Scenario IV applies.12
4.3 Corporate hypocrisy
In the previous subsection we have seen that being socially responsible may
give weaker incentives to monitor for the shareholder, and thus may strengthen
the manager’s incentive to exert eﬀort and increase the shareholder’s mone-
tary payoﬀ. The next step is to evaluate whether a shareholder can beneﬁt
12In this scenario, even though the activist will never exert pressure, there are nega-
tive externalities. The behavior of the socially responsible shareholder and the socially
indiﬀerent shareholder will therefore be diﬀerent.
18from somehow committing to such CSR. That is, will a socially indiﬀerent
shareholder have an incentive to ‘mimic’ a socially responsible shareholder,
and behave as if he inherently cares about the negative externalities imposed
on the activist? We demonstrate below that this may indeed be the case. We
believe that in reality, a shareholder may behave as if he is socially responsi-
ble even though in fact he does not inherently care about stakeholders. This
can be done for example by making an explicit assertion in the ﬁrm’s mission
statement that the shareholder is concerned with the negative externalities
and acts accordingly.13 Such a statement acts as a commitment device for the
shareholder, in the sense that the shareholder cannot deviate from it without
being severely punished by the activist or the public. The shareholder does
this simply because he foresees some beneﬁts from doing so. Indeed, this is
how cynics have often described ﬁrms that engage in CSR.
In this setting the negative externalities do not show up in the shareholder’s
true payoﬀ function, but the shareholder now commits to behaving according
to a diﬀerent objective function which does include the externalities. In
a nutshell, we consider the case in which γS is a strategic variable to be
chosen endogenously by the shareholder at t = 0.14 We refer to this as
‘corporate hypocrisy’ (as opposed to corporate social responsibility) because
the shareholder is in fact socially indiﬀerent (γS = 0) but claims to be socially
responsible, i.e. pretends to have γS > 0, in order to raise his payoﬀs.
This implies that the payoﬀ of the manager and the ‘true’ payoﬀ of the
13It is easy to ﬁnd examples of ﬁrms who mention CSR in their mission statement. Of
course it is hard to verify whether this is evidence of corporate hypocrisy. We acknowledge
that some of them have been referring and committing to CSR long before it became
fashionable, or because their ownership is in the hands of people who inherently care (see
also Section 4.5), but it seems that others do so merely for strategic reasons.
14Of course, one could think of corporate hypocrisy with endogenous γM (rather than
or next to endogenous γS), so where the shareholder — or even the manager himself — could
somehow let te manager commit to act as if he cares for the activist’s payoﬀ. We abstract
from this possibility.
19socially indiﬀerent shareholder will still have the same form as derived in
Section 3, except that now γS = 0. Let us denote this true payoﬀ by US.
Instead of choosing the eﬀort level that will maximize this true payoﬀ (e∗
S
with γS = 0), the socially indiﬀerent shareholder deliberately commits to
choose an optimal eﬀort level that will maximize the payoﬀ of a socially
responsible shareholder by acting as if his payoﬀ is given by Π−γSΩ (rather
than Π). With a slight abuse of notation, we denote this payoﬀ by ￿ US and
the optimal eﬀort levels that maximize this payoﬀ by ￿ eS and ￿ eM.15
We evaluate whether or not the shareholder indeed has an incentive to set
γS > 0 at t = 0. Our conjecture is that by pretending to care for negative
social or environmental externalities of the projects for some parameter val-
ues, the shareholder can commit to exerting lower eﬀort. This occurs if the
activist’s payoﬀ is high for the status quo but low for the project preferred by
the shareholder, iS. Precisely because of this commitment eﬀect the manager
may be induced to increase his eﬀort, and this will beneﬁt the shareholder.16
This explains why the shareholder would endogenously choose to engage in
CSR.
Note that deriving the precise value of γS which maximizes the shareholder’s
expected payoﬀ is analytically diﬃcult because of the possibility of shifting
from one scenario to another when γS changes, and due to possible corner
solutions. Instead of solving for this optimal value, we therefore focus on
verifying whether the socially indiﬀerent shareholder has an incentive to de-
viate from γS = 0. If this is indeed the case, it implies that the shareholder
ﬁnds it optimal to set some strictly positive value for γS.
To verify the incentive of the shareholder to set γS > 0, we consider the mag-
nitude of the shareholder’s true payoﬀ (US) evaluated at the eﬀort level ￿ eS
15Note that ￿ US, ￿ eS and ￿ eM are equivalent to our previously derived US, e∗
S and e∗
M in
Section 3 with γS > 0.
16See also Result 1.
20that maximizes a socially responsible shareholder’s expected payoﬀ ￿ US (for
a given value of γS > 0). We compare this to the magnitude of the share-
holder’s true payoﬀ evaluated at the eﬀort level e∗
S that maximizes this true
payoﬀ function US. Thus, we evaluate the sign of the following expression





and analyze whether it is possible to have ∆US ≥ 0.
We have the following result.
Result 2 In our model, for either of the four scenarios, it can be shown that
the socially indiﬀerent shareholder may ﬁnd it optimal to set a strictly positive
γS at t = 0, i.e. to commit to socially responsible behavior. The incentive
for the shareholder to commit to socially responsible behavior is present even
when there is no threat of pressure by the activist (i.e. in Scenario IV ).
Proof. See Appendix B.
The intuition for this result is as follows, focusing on Scenario I which is
‘symmetric’ in the sense that no matter which project was implemented (iM
or iS), A will exert successful pressure whenever he is present. Suppose
ΩS > ΩM, i.e. the negative externalities from project iS are larger in absolute
value than those from project iM. Whenever the shareholder is informed,
given our assumptions, he will replace the project announced by the manager
by project iS at t = 3. In that case, replacing project iM with project iS
increases the negative externalities. For a shareholder who (behaves as if he)
suﬀers some disutility from the negative externalities imposed on the activist,
such overruling is less attractive. This induces him to exert lower monitoring
eﬀort for any given eM (see also Result 1). As in the standard Burkart et al.
(1998) framework, lower monitoring eﬀort by the shareholder reduces the
probability that the manager is overruled and therefore implies higher eﬀort
21by the manager, which is beneﬁcial to the shareholder. Thus, the shareholder
uses socially responsible behavior to commit to lower monitoring eﬀort in
order to induce the manager to increase his eﬀort. Consequently CSR arises
endogenously for agency reasons. Note that the same reasoning applies in
Scenario IV when there is no threat of pressure by the activist (p = 0).
Summarizing, we have shown that a company may choose to engage in CSR
not only in the presence of pressure groups, but also in the absence of pres-
sure groups. These results are in line with Baron (1995, 2001) on diﬀerent
forms of CSR as mentioned in the introduction. In the former case, the
company engages in CSR either by conceding to the activist’s pressure or
by avoiding such pressure. In the latter case, the company engages in CSR
either because the shareholder is socially responsible or because he commits
ex ante to behave as if he is (setting γS > 0 endogenously). Note that the
case of corporate hypocrisy is observationally equivalent to the case where
the shareholder is socially responsible. Empirically, it will be very diﬃcult
to distinguish between these two situations.
4.4 Bear hug
In this subsection we take the discussion one step further. If we know that
the threat of pressure by the activist aﬀects the manager’s and shareholder’s
behavior and thereby their payoﬀs, and that the shareholder may beneﬁt
from committing to socially responsible behavior, could it also be the case
that the shareholder actually beneﬁts from the presence of the activist? If so,
then in a situation without any threat of pressure (p = 0), the shareholder
may ﬁnd it optimal to sponsor a stakeholder at t = 0 in order to allow the
stakeholder to become an activist and possibly exert pressure on the ﬁrm
(p > 0). In this way the shareholder introduces another agent who monitors
the manager as well as the shareholder himself. Clearly, sponsoring the
22activist can be interpreted as CSR. In the real world, a ﬁrm sponsoring an
activist may be distrusted and accused of bribing. We show that the ﬁrm’s
owner may sincerely hope that the activist will use the funds to put pressure
on the ﬁrm — albeit for proﬁt maximizing reasons.
In order to develop some intuition, let us focus on Scenario III. Here, the
activist - if present — will only exert successful pressure against project iS in
equilibrium, not against iM. By sponsoring the activist, the shareholder can
reduce his own monitoring eﬀort. This induces the manager to exert more
eﬀort, which is beneﬁcial to the shareholder. In Appendix C we present a
numerical example which conﬁrms this intuition. In this example we as-
sume for simplicity that γS = 0, abstracting from altruism and corporate
hypocrisy. We show that indeed the shareholder can increase his expected
payoﬀ by sponsoring a stakeholder at t = 0 to become an activist who exerts
successful pressure (with probability p) — even if this pressure is against the
shareholder’s own preferred project iS. The shareholder is willing to provide
all the funds required by the activist to exert pressure on the ﬁrm. Of course,
one can also imagine a situation where the activist already has some funds
available, but those initial funds are not suﬃcient to cover the costs of suc-
cessful pressure. In that case, the shareholder may only need to give a very
limited amount of funds to the stakeholder/activist in order to induce it to
exert successful pressure.
This discussion raises yet another question. If the activist has suﬃcient
funds available, then why would he exert pressure only with some probability
p < 1? As we argued before, in some situations it seems plausible to argue
that the activist may also exert pressure on other ﬁrms or agents, and if
he has decided to do so before our ﬁrm turns out to announce a project
with negative externalities, the activist may simply have spent his money
otherwise. Thus, if there are other issues which the activist may protest
against, and if these issues are more severe or arise earlier, then the activist
23may not exert pressure even though he has suﬃcient funds available initially.
Finally, as we mentioned above we require conditions on ΩM and ΩS for
Scenario III to arise. More precisely, in our numerical example we require
ΩS > 9
200 for the activist to indeed be willing to exert pressure against project
iS, and we could argue that ΩS follows some probability distribution with
median 9
200. In that case, the condition ΩS > 9
200 will be satisﬁed only with
probability 1
2 and the activist will exert pressure only with p = 1
2, as we
assume in the example.
4.5 Socially responsible shareholders taking over
Here, we will brieﬂy discuss how altruism-based CSR may arise in our frame-
work by way of transfer of corporate control. If there are two types of share-
holders, one of which is socially responsible and thus inherently cares about
the activist, and the other who does not inherently care, then the socially
responsible type may value the shares of the ﬁrm more than the other type
does, and therefore may end up taking over the ﬁrm.
Suppose that the ﬁrm’s shares are freely traded, and that all agents who
initially own or may buy the shares are identical, except for one characteristic,
namely their value of γS. Suppose that there are two types of agents: a
socially responsible type with γS = ¯ γS > 0, and a socially indiﬀerent type
with γS = 0.17 The analysis in Section 4.3 illustrates that for some values
of the parameters, the expected monetary payoﬀ from being a shareholder
of this ﬁrm is higher for the socially responsible type than for the socially
indiﬀerent type.18 This suggests that the socially responsible type may be
17Clearly, the discussion extends to the case where both types of agents are altruistic,
but one is more altruistic than the other.
18Note that we refer to the monetary payoﬀ here, which may be higher for the altruistic
type than for the non-altruistic type, even though the overall expected payoﬀ or utility
of the altruistic type may well be lower than that of the non-altruistic type because it
includes a term −¯ γSΩ. In the discussion here, on takeovers, we need to focus on monetary
24willing to buy shares from the socially indiﬀerent type, who is willing to
sell. Of course, this depends on the question whether the socially responsible
type always cares about the negative externalities, or only cares if he himself
owns the ﬁrm. In the latter case, the socially responsible type will be willing
and able to buy the shares only if the diﬀerence between his and the socially
indiﬀerent type’s monetary proﬁts is suﬃciently large to outweigh the change
in his overall payoﬀ or utility resulting from owning the ﬁrm in the presence
of externalities. As before, this argument holds with or without the presence
of an activist.
Although we do not present a detailed formal analysis here, this discussion
indicates that for some parameter values, there may be a transfer of control
from the socially indiﬀerent type to the socially responsible type because the
latter has an incentive to buy the shares that the former type has an incentive
to sell. This provides an alternative explanation of how CSR may arise in
our framework without resorting to corporate hypocrisy or sponsoring, but
simply by allowing heterogeneous agents some of whom are more socially
responsible than others. Here, the agents who end up being the owners of
the ﬁrm could be those who inherently care about the negative externalities
exerted on stakeholders.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have modelled CSR in the context of a corporate governance
framework originally developed by Burkart et al. (1998). We have described
how shareholder social responsibility and the threat of pressure by an activist
aﬀect eﬀort levels of manager and shareholder. Since CSR may allow the
shareholder to commit to lower monitoring eﬀort, it may induce the manager
payoﬀs since those determine the willingness to pay for a ﬁrm’s shares.
25to exert higher eﬀort, thereby raising proﬁts. Thus, CSR may help solving
the agency problem.
We have analyzed diﬀerent interpretations and forms of CSR and discussed
how they may arise in the context of a principal-agent structure. First,
interpreting CSR as a straightforward implementation of the activist’s pre-
ferred project, we show that it may be payoﬀ-maximizing for the manager
or the shareholder to implement this project either from the beginning or
as a response to activist’s pressure. Second, a socially responsible or altru-
istic shareholder taking into account negative externalities may adjust his
eﬀort level in order to decrease the expected externalities. Third, a share-
holder may ﬁnd it optimal to commit to act as if he is socially responsible
and cares about negative externalities. We referred to this as ‘corporate
hypocrisy.’ For some parameter values, this reduces the shareholder’s incen-
tive to exert eﬀort, increases the manager’s eﬀort and raised proﬁts. Fourth,
we show that the shareholder may beneﬁt from the threat of pressure by the
activist and may therefore ﬁnd it optimal to engage in a ‘bear hug’ and spon-
sor an activist to give it the means to exert pressure. Fifth, we illustrated
that if there are two types of shareholders, one socially responsible and the
other one socially indiﬀerent, the socially responsible type may be able to
extract greater monetary payoﬀs from the ﬁrm and therefore may end up
owning the ﬁrm. CSR due to altruism (whether or not via a takeover) or
corporate hypocrisy may even arise in the absence of an activist. Neverthe-
less, the shareholder has an incentive to respond to the possible presence of
an activist and moreover may have an incentive to introduce an activist by
ﬁnancing it.
Our framework allows for numerous extensions. For example, we could add a
government at the beginning of the game who may tax the proﬁts of projects
with negative externalities or subsidize the activist’s preferred project iA.
Clearly, this would aﬀect the incentive to exert eﬀort of both the manager
26and the shareholder. Other possible extensions include letting the manager
own an equity stake in the ﬁrm so that incentives of manager and shareholder
become more aligned, and letting the manager (rather than the shareholder)
be socially responsible or commit to CSR.
In our analysis, we have used many simplifying assumptions and therefore fo-
cus on speciﬁc situations. Our framework shows that CSR may be explained
by agency reasons. However, either a more general framework or models tai-
lored to particular situations or markets are needed to assess when exactly
and to what extent ﬁrms engage in CSR. This is left for future research.
Appendix A: Derivation of equilibrium eﬀort
levels for Scenarios II-IV





1, then if the activist is present and project iM was implemented at
t = 4, in equilibrium the activist will exert pressure and the shareholder S
will concede, so that in the end project iA will be implemented. However,
if project iS was implemented at t = 4, in equilibrium iA will not be im-
plemented at t = 6 because it is too expensive for the activist to force the
shareholder to concede. Expected payoﬀs of the manager and shareholder





















































































1 , then if the activist is present and project iS was implemented at
t = 4, in equilibrium the activist will exert pressure and the shareholder S
will concede, so that in the end project iA will be implemented. However, if
project iM was implemented at t = 4, in equilibrium iA will not be imple-
mented at t = 6, because it is too expensive for the activist to induce the
shareholder to concede. Expected payoﬀs of the manager and shareholder





















































1 − [(1 − p)(BS) + p(BA − CM) − BM]Z
,
with





















j = M,S. Then, in equilibrium the activist never ﬁnds it optimal to exert
pressure, no matter which project was implemented originally. This implies
that in Scenario IV we are back to the original Burkart et al. (1998) setting.





































ΠS − γSΩS −
￿
ΠM − γSΩM￿￿
1 − (BS − BM)(ΠS − γSΩS − (ΠM − γSΩM))
.
Appendix B: Proofs of Results 1 and 2
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The result then follows using the fact that the socially responsible shareholder
has γS > 0 whereas the irresponsible shareholder has γS = 0. ￿
29Proof of Result 2 To verify that there is a γS > 0 for which ∆US ≥ 0 it
















































so the sign of this derivative equals the sign of ΩS −ΩM. Thus, using Result
1 the ﬁrst term in (1) is negative. However, evaluated in the point γS = 0



















and again using Result 1 the sign of the second term in (1) equals the sign
of ΩS − ΩM. That is, the second term is strictly positive (even for γS = 0)
whenever ΩS > ΩM. So, if parameters are such that we end up in Scenario
I and furthermore ΩS > ΩM we have dUI
S/dγS > 0 at least for γS near zero,
that is, the shareholder will ﬁnd it optimal to set some γS > 0.
The proof for the other scenarios goes along the same lines, and it can be veri-






ΩS > (1 − p)ΩM
(1 − p)ΩS > ΩM
for Scenarios x ∈ {I,IV },
for Scenario x = II,
for Scenario x = III;
we have dUI
S/dγS > 0 at least for γS near 0, that is, the shareholder will ﬁnd
it optimal to set some γS > 0. ￿
30Appendix C: Numerical example of bear hug
In this appendix we present a numerical example of the bear hug discussed in
Section 4.4. We assume that γS = 0 for simplicity — that is, we abstract from
altruism and corporate hypocrisy here — and we compare the shareholder’s
equilibrium payoﬀ to his equilibrium payoﬀ without the activist (i.e., sub-
stituting p = 0, which is equivalent to using the expressions as derived in
Appendix A for Scenario IV ). In this example the shareholder indeed ﬁnds
it optimal to fund an activist who will overrule the project iS which the
shareholder himself selects whenever he is informed.
Suppose that we have the following:
Π
M = 8, Π
















the activist’s cost of exerting pressure is cA = λ
2/2, and ΩM, ΩS are such





9, and expected payoﬀ for the shareholder is UIII∗
S = 290
81 ￿
3.580. Without the activist, eﬀort levels would be eIII∗




S |p=0 = eIV ∗
S = 2
3, and the shareholder’s expected payoﬀ is given
by UIII
S |p=0 = UIV
S = 26
9 ￿ 2.889. So indeed, for these parameter values
the shareholder can increase his expected payoﬀ by introducing an activist
who exerts successful pressure (with probability p = 1
2) — even though this
pressure is against the shareholder’s own preferred project iS.
The expected payoﬀ to the shareholder increases by approximately 3.580 −
2.889 = 0.691. Since we set γS = 0, this can be interpreted as the change




1 , which for
this numerical example can be rewritten as ΩS > 9
200 and ΩM ≤ 1
128.
31in the shareholder’s expected monetary payoﬀ. The cost to the activist of









0.045, thus in this example the shareholder is indeed willing to provide all
the funds required by the activist to exert pressure on the ﬁrm.
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